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ARTICLES
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT
OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: A PROPOSAL




The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity is frequently
used by courts to deny a right of action or remedy against the "sov-
ereign" United States, unless such immunity is specifically waived.
Judicial interpretation of waiver has fluctuated throughout the doc-
trine's history. The current trend favors a narrow interpretation,
thereby precluding causes of action or remedies against the sover-
eign. Such restrictive interpretations, however, ultimately under-
mine the intent of some legislation by denying actions or remedies
that are expressly authorized in the plain language of the statutes'
waiver provisions. These interpretations have been criticized as
"tortured discussion[s]"1 that use "ingenuity to create ambiguity." 2
This article proposes that where a cause of action is available
against the sovereign through an explicit Waiver, the full range of
remedies provided within the statutory scheme should be available
for all suits against the sovereign, regardless of whether the govern-
ment or private citizens initiate action. This position is particularly
* B.A., cum laude, University of Rochester, 1986; J.D., M.S.L., Vermont Law School,
1989. Mr. Abate is the founder and president of EnviroLex Publishing Group in'Cheshire,
Connecticut. He is an adjunct professor at Vermont Law School. Previously, Mr. Abate
was an environmental law writer with the Manhattan law firm of Berle, Kass & Case and a
legal writing instructor at Vermont Law School.
** B.A., Dartmouth College, 1990; J.D., cum laude, M.S.L., summa cum laude, Vermont
Law School, 1995. Ms. Cogswell is a judicial clerk for the district and circuit courts in
Hood River and Wasco Counties, Oregon. She is a member of the Oregon Bar. Ms. Cogs-
well gratefully acknowledges the experience and insight she acquired since 1994 as a legal
intern with the Columbia River Gorge Commission under the direction of its counsel, Law-
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1 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 631 (1992) (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
2 Id. at 633 (quoting Rothchild v. United States, 179 U.S. 463, 465 (1900)).
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relevant to pollution control statutes insofar as the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of several federal environmental stat-
utes reflect congressional intent to target the polluting activities of
federal facilities, as well as private entities, TO provide a frame-
work for discussion, this article focuses primarily on case law that
reads undue limitations into the citizen suit provisions of the Clean
Water Act (CWA),3 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA),4 the Clean Air Act (CAA),5 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).6 These narrow interpretations have precluded citizens from
suing federal facilities for civil penalties, ignoring the explicit con-
gressional intent to provide for such penalties.7
The doctrine of sovereign immunity should, however, continue
to limit the causes of action available against the sovereign to those
explicitly enumerated within a given statutory scheme. This limita-
tion ensures that the congressional intent embodied in the statu-
tory scheme is fulfilled. Implied causes of action that are
"piggybacked" onto express congressional waivers can undermine
statutory objectives. To uphold congressional intent, courts must
not imply a waiver unless Congress has explicitly provided one.
For example, the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area
Act' (Gorge Act or Act), a federal initiative aimed at protecting
resources within the Columbia River Gorge in Oregon and Wash-
ington, presents a strong argument for a narrow interpretation of
waiver. The District of Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have interpreted the citizen suit provision of the
Gorge Act to exclude causes of action brought by landowners
alleging a "taking" of their land.9 By enacting the Gorge Act, Con-
gress explicitly intended to protect the scenic, natural, recreational,
and cultural resources within the Gorge. 10 To attain this objective,
the Act's citizen suit provision prohibits takings claims against the
implementing agency (the Columbia River Gorge Commission)."
3 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
5 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
7 See infra parts III.B.1, III.D.
8 Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 544-544p (1994).
9 See infra part IV.B.2.
10 16 U.S.C. § 544a(1).
11 16 U.S.C. § 544c.
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A narrow construction of the sovereign immunity waiver in the
Gorge Act's citizen suit provision avoids undermining the Act's
objectives. When applied properly, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is a valuable mechanism that can secure this important
and narrow construction.
Part II of this article discusses the origins of the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine, its evolution in the American judicial'system, and the
varying rationales supporting its application. This section also
details increased criticism of the. doctrine as its application has
moved progressively further from its original moorings.
Part III illustrates why this criticism is justified in the context of
citizen suits seeking civil penalties from federal facilities under the
CWA, RCRA, the CAA, and CERCLA. Part III argues that, once
citizens have obtained standing against the federal government,
injunctive relief and civil penalties should be available to citizens in
order to further the goals of the statutes. This issue created a split
in the circuits that was recently resolved in the controversial United
States Department of Energy v. Ohio decision.12 Unfortunately,
through a narrow construction of waiver, the Court held that civil
penalties are not available under the citizen suit provisions of the
CWA and RCRA.'3 Part III also examines legislative history and
policy arguments demonstrating that Ohio thwarted congressional
intent.
Part IV analyzes how the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
been appropriately applied to limit private causes of action under
environmental statutes that provide other explicit means of
enforcement. Allowing implied causes of action against an admin-
istrative body under- such statutes is redundant and can undermine
agency enforcement efforts. Instead, citizens should frame their
suits within the boundaries of citizen suit provisions authorized by
Congress. By recognizing only those causes of action against the
sovereign that fall explicitly within a statute's provisions, citizen
actions serve to enforce the specific purposes of the statute rather
than to harass the agency or undermine the environmental protec-
tion goals of the legislation. Part IV first explores the foundations
of this limitation on implied private causes of action and then ana-
lyzes the limitation in the context of the Gorge Act and recent judi-
cial- interpretations of its citizen suit provision. Part IV also
illustrates the value of the sovereign immunity doctrine in this con-
12 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
13 Id. at 617-18.
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text, revealing that proposals for abolition of the doctrine are
unjustified.
II. LEGAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity traces to English common law and, has
evolved in the United States for nearly two centuries as a federal
common law doctrine. In its purest form, the doctrine immunizes
the federal government from suit. The government may, however,
consent to suit by waiving its immunity. In turn, the courts deter-
mine the limits of such waivers through statutory interpretation.
Recently, narrow constructions of seemingly clear congressional
waivers of sovereign immunity have undermined citizen enforce-
ment of environmental statutes. 14
A. The Doctrine's Origin and Evolution
Sovereign immunity originated in English common law. The
traditional basis for the doctrine assumed that "the king could do
no wrong," and therefore could not be sued without his consent.1 5
In the United States, the doctrine developed through constitutional
interpretation, beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland.16
The king's sovereignty was imputed to the United States govem-
ment because it is the institutional descendant of the Crown and
thus enjoys its immunity.' 7 Accordingly, the traditional immunity
of the English sovereign survived the Constitution's grant of judi-
cial power over controversies in which the United States is a
party. 8 Beyond these origins, the holding in McCulloch has
evolved into the modern doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
precludes courts from enforcing judgments against the federal gov-
ernment without its consent.
Three principal rationales support the application of sovereign
immunity in the United States: (1) sustaining separation of pow-
ers; (2) protecting the government from the "undue interference"
14 See infra part II.B.
15 Michael D. Axline et al., Stones for David's Sling: Civil Penalties In Citizen Suits
Against Polluting Federal Facilities, 2 J. ENvnL. L. & LITG. 1, 17 & n.81 (1987).
16 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (concluding generally that the states do not have the power to
interfere with the operation of federal law; holding specifically that the Bank of the United
States is immune from state taxation).
17 Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need
for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties
Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 389, 396-97 & n.38 (1970).
18 Id.
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of legal actions seeking damages; and (3) protecting the public
fisc. 19 Although grounded in sound public policy, each of these
rationales has developed a wide array of exceptions, 20 the most
important of which is the doctrine of waiver.
A specific congressional statutory waiver allows the government
to abrogate its immunity and consent to suit.21 Several judicial
standards have developed that govern interpretation of provisions
"waiving" the protection of sovereign immunity. Courts have gen-
erally relied upon rules of statutory construction that narrowly con-
strue waivers of sovereign immunity, thus holding in favor of the
United States and its agencies in citizen suits for damages or spe-
cific performance.22 More specifically, courts must interpret statu-
tory provisions that appear to relinquish sovereign immunity
strictly,23 in favor of the sovereign, and they may not enlarge the
waiver "beyond what the language requires." 24 Waiver "cannot be
implied but must be unequivocally expressed. '25
Conversely, a less frequently applied standard recognizes that
when Congress enacts clear waivers of sovereign immunity, courts
should not thwart congressional intent by applying an "unduly
restrictive interpretation" to the waivers.26 To determine whether
a waiver is clear, the controlling factor for the court is the "under-
19 Elizabeth Hocking, Survey, Federal Facility Violations of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act and the Questionable Role of Sovereign Immunity, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 203,
207-12 (1991).
20 See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) (waiving the federal
government's sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by federal officers).
21 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584 (1941).
22 See, e.g., Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986) (requiring a waiver of
immunity from an interest award separate from a waiver of immunity from an award of
attorney's fees); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951) (explaining that statutes
waiving sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed).
23 McMahon, 342 U.S. at 27..
24 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 685 (quoting Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S.
675, 686 (1927)).
25 United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (holding that Congress did not intend to
expand the Court of Claims jurisdiction in passing the Declaratory Judgment Act); accord
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (holding that section 106(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code does not waive immunity from an action seeking monetary recovery
in a bankruptcy proceeding); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)
(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)) (holding that the rule of equi-
table tolling applies in suits against the United States once Congress has unequivocally
waived sovereign immunity); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)) (explaining that the Tucker Act is only a juris-
dictional statute and does not waive sovereign immunity).
26 Ohio v. Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Canadian Aviator,
Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945)), rev'd, 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
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lying congressional policy. ' 27 However, this minority rule rarely
controls the interpretation, even when such underlying policy is
readily apparent (as in the context of pollution control legislation).
Depending upon the era and the dominant political agenda,
courts have applied these varying standards in construing waivers.
However, varying standards are not the sole cause of fluctuations
in the breadth of waiver; the use of the sovereign immunity'doc-
trine in a manner that represents a departure from its jurispruden-
tial origin has also influenced the breadth of waiver.2" For
instance, the rationale that the government must be able to per-
form its functions without "undue interference" does not justify
restrictive readings of waiver, although such rationales impliedly
invoke the sovereign immunity doctrine and its accompanying the-
ory. In addition, civil suits against federal facilities do not threaten
federal funds - funds are merely taken from the offending agency
and returned to the federal treasury. 29 This severance of Sovereign
immunity from its doctrinal underpinnings has produced an unpre-
dictable range of outcomes, some of which recognize and further
legislative intent, while others ignore and, thus, undermine it.30
By allowing citizen suits against federal facilities, Congress has
attempted to relieve the restrictive effect of the doctrine. More
than half a century ago, the Supreme Court observed, a "sense of
justice has brought a progressive relaxation by legislative enact-
ment of the rigor of the immunity rule. As representative govern-
ments attempt to ameliorate inequalities as necessities will permit,
prerogatives of the government yield to the needs of the citizen."'"
While this observation embodies a strong argument in favor of lib-
eral construction of sovereign immunity waivers, the Supreme
27 Id. at 1059-60 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 521
(1984)).
28 See supra notes 21-26; Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95 (making available equitable tolling in suits
against the government "in the same way that it is available to private suits"); Block v.
Neal, 460 U.S. 289,298 (1983) (refusing to recognize sovereign immunity in spite of the fact
that the stated cause of action overlapped actions from which sovereign immunity had not
been waived); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (refusing to act a
guardian of the Treasury when construing waivers of sovereign immunity).
29 Axline, supra note 15, at 19.
30 See supra notes 21-26 (cases invoking the same common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity, yet arriving at different outcomes). See generally Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992);
Broughton Lumber Co. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 975 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that waiver of sovereign immunity in state court does not waive sovereign immu-
nity in federal court), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); Broughton Lumber Co. v. Yeutter,
939 F.2d 1547 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that waiver must authorize suit in a particular
court).
31 United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940).
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Court has nevertheless enlarged the scope of sovereign immunity
in the modern era, most probably due to its misapprehension of the
doctrine's historical foundations.32
B. Sovereign Immunity and Citizen Enforcement Actions
The Supreme Court's strict construction of waiver in Ohio33
prompted renewed criticism that sovereign immunity is nothing
more than a judge-made rule that is sometimes favored and some-
times disfavored.34 As a theoretical matter, the doctrine's original
reliance on the notion that a divinely ordained monarch "can do no
wrong" has long been thoroughly discredited. Moreover, as a
practical matter, the persistent threat that the doctrine poses "to
the impartial administration of justice has been repeatedly
acknowledged and recognized. 36
Within the environmental statutes, Congress has incorporated
limitations on citizen suits and remedies against polluting federal
facilities. Thus, application of sovereign immunity in this context
seems unnecessary and unintended and naturally draws criticism.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has generally been criticized
for: (1) causing serious substantive injustice; (2) removing contro-
versies from the courts and placing them in ill-equipped forums,
thereby producing final determinations without the necessary pro-
cedural safeguards; and (3) inefficiently allocating controversies to
other forums when well-suited for court resolution.37 Moreover,
now that citizen suit provisions are routinely adopted as a viable
means of environmental enforcement, 38 the use of sovereign immu-
nity to limit the scope of available enforcement mechanisms has
become particularly problematic.
Ironically, while the availability of judicial ,review has
expanded, 39 reviewing courts have used sovereign immunity to
32 See, e.g., supra note 28 and accompanying text; Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 33-34;
Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983); Mitchell, 445
U.S. at 538.
33 503 U.S. at 628.
34 Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35 Id. See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979) ("We must of course reject the
fiction [that the king does no wrong]."); Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343
(1880) ("[tjhe English maxim ... has'[no] existence in this country").
36 Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Kenneth C. Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 383 (1970).
38 See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; CAA, id. at § 7604; CERCLA,
id. at §'9659.
39 See Barlow v. Collins,, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) (explaining that judicial review of
administrative action is the rule and nonreviewability the exception); Association of Data
1995]
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restrict the categories of relief available to plaintiffs4 0 As part III
discusses, citizens can obtain injunctive relief to prevent future pol-
lution from federal facilities; however, they are precluded from
obtaining civil penalties, which provide significant and perhaps the
greatest deterrent against future violatioris.41 Essentially, what the
courts have given with one hand by liberalizing the availability of
judicial review, they have taken away with the other by diluting the
effectiveness of citizen suits.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN INAPPROPRIATE SHIELD FOR
FEDERAL FACILITIES
A significant number of federal facilities in the United States
and abroad fail to comply with environmental statutes.42 Paradoxi-
cally, the EPA did not attempt to coerce compliance through court
action until recently,43 and only a few courts held that citizen suit
provisions allowed for civil penalties against such federal facili-
ties.4 More surprisingly still, the Court in Ohio held that RCRA
and the CWA did not waive sovereign immunity from civil penal-
ties.45 Ohio appears wrong on its face and as a matter of policy.4 6
Fortunately, some courts have distinguished Ohio and have inter-
preted sovereign immunity waivers broadly in other contexts,
thereby preserving the powerful deterrent of civil penalties against
federal facilities in the oversight schemes implied by citizen suit
provisions. 7
Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970) (stating "[t]here is no presumption
against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism"); Dunlop v. Bachowski,
421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) (noting petitioner's heavy burden of overcoming "the strong pre-
sumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review"). But see Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that respondents failed to demonstrate
an injury in fact, and therefore lacked standing to seek judicial review); Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (holding that respondents failed to show that their
interests were actually affected by petitioners' actions, and therefore did not meet an
Administrative Procedure Act prerequisite to judicial review).
40 Axline, supra note 15, at 19.
41 See infra part III.D.
42 See infra part III.A.
43 See infra notes 53 (discussing "unitary executive" theory), 104-109 (discussing Federal
Facilities Compliance Act of 1992), 114-116 (discussing Federal Facilities Clean Water
Compliance .Act) and accompanying text.
44 See infra part III.B.
45 See infra part III.C.
46 See infra parts III.C.1-3, III.D. (arguing for non-restrictive interpretations of sover-
eign immunity waivers).
47 See infra part III.E.
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A. Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws 'Against Federal
Facilities
The violation of pollution control laws by federal facilities poses
an enormous problem. Over 25,000 federal facilities in the United
States and abroad pose potential pollution problems.18 "Federal
facilities fail to comply with the CWA twice as frequently as private
industry," and sixty-three percent of federal facilities have commit-'
ted serious RCRA violations.4 9 Furthermore, 1,000 to 4,000 fed-
eral facilities nationwide are either on or eligible for the CERCLA
National Priorities List. The Department of, Energy (DOE) and
the Department of Defense (DOD) operate most of these
facilities. °
The federal government recognizes the deterrent effect of mone-
tary fines and frequently seeks to assess civil penalties or criminal
fines against private polluters. Even the DOE acknowledges the
value of "'stipulated penalties', to 'avoid stalling the cleanup pro-
cess' at dangerously polluted federal facilities."'5 1 Despite this
acknowledgement, the federal government vigorously resists any
attempt to apply civil penalties to polluting federal facilities. 2
Some courts acquiesced immediately to this governmental resist-
ance and precluded citizensfrom obtaining civil penalties against
federal facility violators, consistent with the EPA's refusal to bring
suit against these facilities 'because of its internal policy against
suing other federal agencies for violations of environmental laws.
This policy arose out of the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) posi-
tion that one federal agency cannot sue another. Such a suit would
not present a justiciable controversy under Article III of the Con-
stitution because it involves only one party according to the "Uni-
tary Executive" theory.5 3 Therefore, by refusing to allow citizens
48 Axline, supra note 15, at 4.
49 Daniel Home, Case Note, Federal Facility Environmental Compliance After United
States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 632, 638 (1994).
50 Axline, supra note 15, at 5. See generally Nancy E. Milsten, Note, How Well Can
States Enforce Their Environmental Laws When the Polluter Is the U.S. Government?, 18
RUTGERS L.J. 123 (1986).
51 Home, supra note 49, at 632 (quoting DOE, EPA Reach Settlement in Dispute Over
Fines for Delays in Cleanup of Fernaln, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 125 (May 17, 1991).
52 Axline, supra note 15, at 2.
53 Id. at 3; see also Nelson D. Cary, Note, A Primer on Federal Facility Compliance with
Environmental Laws: Where Do We Go From Here?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 801, 828
(1993) (explaining generally the unitary executive ,theory). The Federal Facilities Compli-
ance Act of 1992 under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (Supp. V. 1993), may nullify some of the
effects of the EPA's policy, at least with respect to RCRA. Although the results are not
yet clear, it expressly targets federal facilities and thereby strengthens the argument that
1995]
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to sue for civil penalties, the courts removed the teeth from pollu-
tion control laws and created a "Catch-22" situation where the
most effective deterrent provided for by Congress is not used
against some of the most egregious polluters'
This anomalous situation created a split in the lower courts.
Some courts held that civil penalties are available under the citizen
suit provisions of the CWA54 and RCRA55 in order to effectuate
congressional intent. Others used sovereign immunity to -force
strained interpretations of these same provisions and precluded cit-
izens from obtaining civil penalties against federal facilities. 6 In
1992, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ohio resolved
this split.57
B. The Split in the Circuits
1. Holdings Against Civil Penalty Awards in RCRA and CWA
Citizen Suits
Prior to Ohio, several federal courts had refused to find a waiver
of sovereign immunity from civil penalties under the CWA and
RCRA. For example, in McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.
Weinberger (MESS), 58 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California concluded that federal facilities are
not subject to civil penalties in citizen suit actions brought under
the CWA and RCRA.59 The court held that, even though RCRA's
citizens should also be able to sue for civil penalties against federal polluters. See infra
notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
54 CWA § 505 authorizes citizens to sue any person, including the United States, for
violations of the Act and to seek specified remedies, including civil penalties. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365. It provides that "any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf (1)
against any person (including (i) the United States ... ) who is alleged to be in violation of
(A) an effluent standard or limitation." Id. Furthermore, the section provides that "[t]he
district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation
... and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title." Id.
55 Under RCRA § 7002, the. citizen suit provision, citizens are allowed to commence a
civil action "against any person, including ... the United States" for past or present viola-
tions of RCRA's provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). The last sentence of section
7002(a) vests the district court with jurisdiction "to order such person to take such other
action as may be necessary ... and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [§ 3008]
(a) and (g) of this title." Id. at § 6972(a).
56 See infra part III.B.
57 See infra part III.C.
58 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986), vacated sub nom. MESS v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325 (9th
Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995).
59 655 F.2d at 603-05. See also Mitzenfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293
(10th Cir. 1990) (RCRA's federal facilities provision does not waive sovereign immunity);
California v. Department of Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988) (CWA's federal facilities
provision does not waive sovereign immunity); California v. Department of Defense, 18
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citizen suit provision referred to the United States as a "person"
and authorized the imposition of civil penalties against any such
"person, ' 60 Congress failed to include the United States under
RCRA's definition of "person."61 Therefore, Congress had not
unambiguously waived federal immunity from civil penalties.62
The court also reasoned that it would be inconsistent to authorize
citizens to sue for civil penalties under the citizen suit provision
when the EPA itself cannot do so under its general enforcement
authority.63
Similarly, the court in MESS held that there is no waiver of sov-
ereign immunity in the CWA,6 4 notwithstanding section 505's
explicit language authorizing citizens to seek relief against any per-
son including the United States. The court determined that
because section 505's language authorizing civil penalties refers to
the civil penalties provision (section 309), and because the general
definition section (section 502) does not include "United States" in
its definition of "person" for the purposes of civil penalties, section
505 does not allow civil penalties in a citizen suit against the United
States.65
2. Holdings Allowing Civil Penalty Awards in RCRA, CWA, and
CAA Citizen Suits
Prior to the Ohio decision, one circuit court had held that Con-
gress did waive sovereign immunity from civil penalties under the
CWA.66 In Sierra Club v. Lujan,67 the court held that the federal
facilities provisions and the citizen suit provisions evinced clear
congressional intent to authorize civil penalties under the CWA.
The court construed the citizen suit provision to authorize civil
penalties, stating that "a specific statutory provision will govern
notwithstanding the fact that a general provision, standing alone,
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21023 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (RCRA's federal facilities provision
does not waive sovereign immunity).
60 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
61 Id. at § 6903 (15).
62 MESS, 655 F. Supp. at 603-604.
63 Id. at 604. The court's conclusion stems from the self-imposed EPA policy that it
cannot pursue any form of judicial enforcement against federal agencies, not from an
independent statutory interpretation.
64 655 F. Supp. at 605.
65 Id. at 605. The court summarized its rationale as, "again there is an all-encompassing
.introductory definition ... which defines 'person' as everybody under the sun save for the
United States."
66 See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated, 504 U.S. 902 (1992).
67 Id. at 1427.
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may include the same subject matter. '68 The Tenth Circuit held
that the general definition in section 502(5) does not trump the
definition of "person" contained in the citizen suit provision.69
Some federal district courts followed a similar line of reasoning,
holding that the federal facilities provisions contained in the CWA
and RCRA allow citizens to sue federal facilities for civil penal-
ties.7° Courts have also found that the CAA7 1 waives sovereign
immunity from the imposition of civil penalties under the federal
facilities provision.72 However, the Tenth Circuit in Sierra Club is
the only federal appellate court to find a waiver of federal sover-
eign immunity within the CWA's citizen suit provision. No other
federal appellate court has considered this question under RCRA
or the CAA.
C. Resolving the Split in the Circuits:'United States Department
of Energy v. Ohio
In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the state of Ohio
sued the DOE for alleged environmental violations stemming from
the DOE's operation of a uranium-processing plant in Ohio.73
Among other relief, the state sought federal civil penalties for past
violations of RCRA and the CWA. 74 The DOE conceded that
these two statutes rendered "federal agencies liable for fines
imposed to induce them to comply with injunctions or other judi-
cial orders designed to modify behavior prospectively" ("coercive
fines").75 The issue was whether the federal facilities or citizen suit
sections of RCRA and the CWA 76 waived federal sovereign immu-
* 68 Id. (quoting United States v. Prescon, 695 F.2d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 1982)).
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Maine v. Department of Navy, 702 'F. Supp. 322 (D. Me. 1988), vacated, 973
F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. Department of Navy, 722 F. Supp.
1565 (N.D. III. 1989).
71 42 U.S.C. § 7418.
72 See, e.g., Alabama v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986); United
States v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
73 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
74 Id. at 612.
75 Id. at 613.
76 States may sue the United States under the citizen suit provisions of the CWA and
RCRA. Id.'at 613 n.5. Section 1365(a) provides that any "citizen" may bring a citizen suit
under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988). For purposes of the CWA citizen suit provi-
sion, citizen is defined as a "person ... having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected," and "person" is defined to include a state. Id. at § 1365(g)-(h)(1988). See also
42 U.S.C. § 6972 ("any person" may bring a citizen suit under RCRA); id. at § 6903(15)
("person" under RCRA includes a state).
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nity from liability for "punitive" fines for past violations of those
statutes.7"
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio held that both statutes waived federal sovereign immunity
from punitiye fines.78 The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and held
that Congress had waived immunity for punitive fines in the
CWA's federal facilities section and in RCRA's citizen suit provi-
sion, but not in RCRA's federal facilities section.79 On appeal, a
majority of the Supreme Court determined that Congress had not
waived the federal government's sovereign immunity from liability
for civil penalties imposed by a state for past violations of the
CWA or RCRA. s°
In analyzing the statutes' respective citizen suit provisions, the
majority adopted the court's reasoning in MESS, disregarding the
state of Ohio's argument that "'Congress could not avoid noticing
that its literal language subject[ed] federal entities to penalties.' ' 81
In doing so, the Court ignored the relevant legislative history and
instead relied exclusively on rules of statutory construction.
Applying a rule of construction whereby a particular section of a
statute referring to another section must be read as encompassing
all the terms and limitations of that section, 'the Court concluded
that significant limitations result from restricting the applicability
of the civil penalties sections to "persons." 82 As in MESS, the
Court relied on the fact that neither statute included the United
States in its general definition of "person." "Its omission has to be
seen as a pointed one when so many other governmental entities
are specified, a fact that renders the civil-penalties sections inappli-
cable to the United States. 8s3
In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished between sec-
tions merely redefining "person" within a particular clause from
77 503 U.S. at 612-13.
78 Id. at 614.
79 Id. Because the :court held that the CWA's federal facilities section waived immunity,
it never reached the issue under the CWA's citizen suit provision.
80 Id. at 628. Justice Souter delivered the majority opinion in which Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice White joined by Justices Black-
mun and Stevens, concurred with the decision regarding RCRA's federal facilities section,
but dissented on the other issues, stating that the majority had adopted "an unduly restric-
tive interpretation" of the federal facilities and citizen suit provisions of the CWA and of
the citizen suit provision of RCRA. Id. at 630, quoting Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United
States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945).
81 Id: at 617 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 36).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).
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redefinition for the entire section in which the special definition
occurred. "[T]he inference can only be that a special definition not
described as being for purposes of the 'section' or 'subchapter' in
which it occurs was intended to have the more limited application
to its own clause or sentence alone. ' 84 Thus, the Court held that
while the United States could be sued under the citizen stit provi-
sions, it was not subject to civil penalties under the incorporated
sections.
The Court's reasoning in Ohio is faulty in at least two respects.
First, the rules of statutory interpretation suggest that specific defi-
nitions of "person" in RCRA and the CWA trump the' statutes'
general definitions of the same. 5 Second, the legislative history of
RCRA and the CWA clearly indicates congressional intent to
authorize civil penalties in citizen suits against federal .facilities.86
Moreover, by eliminating the specter of civil penalties, the Court
undermined citizen efforts to oversee federal agency conduct .87
1. Statutory Interpretation
The rules of statutory interpretation that should have governed
the Court's analysis in Ohio would have allowed citizens to sue for
civil penalties against federal polluters under these statutes. Gen-
erally, specific definitions govern more general one's. Therefore,
the meaning and coverage in a general definition of "person" need
not apply everywhere throughout the CWA, especially in subsec-
tions governed by their own set of definitions.89
Although courts should not isolate one section of an act from the
rest, as this ultimately undermines the integrity and intent of the
Act as a whole, Congress would not have impliedly excluded fed-
eral polluters from only some civil remedies. In other words, once
Congress had waived sovereign immunity for citizen suits gener-
ally, if it had sought to exempt federal facilities from one remedy
provided for under citizen suits, but not from others, it would have
made that distinction explicit in the language of the citizen suit pro-
,vision itself.
84 Id. at 619.
85 See infra part Ill.C.1.
86 See infra parts III.C.2-3.
87 See infra part III.D.
88 NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2B § 51.05 (5th ed.
1992).
89 See, e.g., supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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In addition, applying the Supreme Court's reasoning to every
-section containing the term "person" will yield absurd and incon-
gruous results. For example, section 301(a) states that "the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 90 Section
404(n)(4)(A) applies to "[a]ny person who willfully or negligently
violates any condition or limitation in a permit." 91 If a federal pol-
luter cannot be sued for civil penalties in a citizen suit because the
section 1319(d) civil penalty section uses the word "person," then
federal polluters cannot be sued for any violation of key CWA pro-
visions, such as section 303 and section 404, because they impose
liability on all entities included under the definition of "persons."
Such a result would mean that federal facilities are not subject to
citizen suits at all (or perhaps to the CWA at all), a conclusion that
contravenes the statutory language and legislative history of the
Act.92
The same analysis applies under RCRA. Congress refers to sec-
tion 3008 within section 7002 in order to identify the penalties
available against federal facilities under the citizen suit provision.93
However, if Congress intended to limit the available remedies, it
could have included an explicit statement to that effect.
As under the CWA, the general definition of "person" in RCRA
section 1004(15) should not control every section of the statute
when some sections have broader applicability on their face.
Moreover, if the Court's logic in Ohio were extended to other
areas of the Act referring to "persons" as subject to particular pro-
visions, the government would be exempt from all citizen enforce-
ment actions of the substantive provisions of RCRA. For example,
section 3005(a) requires "each person" who owns or operates a
facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes
to obtain a permit for such activity.94 Section 3010(a) of RCRA
provides that "any person" who generates hazardous wastes must
notify the EPA of the location and nature of the activity and iden-
tify the specific hazardous wastes involved.95 Congress intended to
apply -this section to federal facilities through section 6001, the fed-
eral facilities section. However, if the United States is not a "per-
90 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
91 Id. at § 1344(s)(4)(A).
92 Axline, supra note 15, at 32.
93 Id. at 33.
94 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a).
95 Id. at § 6930(a).
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son" for purposes of RCRA, federal facilities would not have to
comply with this or any other provision of the statute. 6
2. RCRA Legislative History
RCRA's legislative history contains ample evidence that Con-
gress intended to make civil penalties available in citizen suits
against federal facilities. In drafting the 1984 Amendments to
RCRA, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce criticized
and attempted to remedy the EPA's inadequate civil and criminal
enforcement efforts.97 The Committee also chastised the DOJ's
lackluster hazardous waste enforcement record. 98 Noting that "liti-
gation expertise is not the sole province of the Justice Depart-
ment," 99 the Committee stated that citizen involvement was
explicitly contemplated to attain a higher number of enforcement
actions. 100
Furthermore, the Sendte expressed its reliance on citizen
enforcement by adding the civil penalty relief provision to the
RCRA citizen suit provision:
A non-complying agency ... [is] subject to the citizen suit
and penalty provision of section 7002. To assure that there
is no confusion as to this approach, the amendments to sec-
tion 7002 continue to use the current statutory language to
authorize specifically a suite [sic] against any person, includ-
ing the United States.1"'
RCRA's citizen suit provision authorizes citizens to seek appropri-
ate civil penalties under sections 6928(a) and (g).10 2 The Senate
Committee explicitly stated that this reference authorizes civil pen-
alties against agencies disobeying court orders, as well as any fed-
eral "noncomplying agency."'01 3 These amendments and comments
were ignored by the Supreme Court in Ohio.
Following the Ohio decision, Congress passed the Federal Facili-
ties Compliance Act of 1992 (FFCA)1°4 in an effort to make its
sovereign immunity waiver "as clear and unambiguous as humanly
96 Axline, supra note 15, at 34.
97 H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N 5576, 5579.
98 Id. at 5609-10.
99 Id. at 5610.
100 Id. at 5612.
101 S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1983).
102 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
103 S. REp., supra note 101, at 44.
104 Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (Supp. V. 1993).
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possible."'10 5 The FFCA amends RCRA's federal facilities section,
explicitly overruling the RCRA component of the Supreme
Court's Ohio decision 10 6 by stating that:
The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and pro-
cedural requirements referred to in this subsection include,
but are not limited to, all administrative orders and all civil
and administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether
such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or
are imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing viola-
tions. The United States hereby expressly waives any immu-
nity otherwise applicable to the United States with respect
to any, such substantive or procedural requirement (includ-
ing, but not limited to, any injunctive relief, administrative
order or civil or administrative penalty or fine referred to in
the preceding sentence, or reasonable service charge)." 7
Moreover, the citizen suit and civil penalties sections have been
similarly amended through incorporation - the general definition
of "person" in section 6903(15) of RCRA now includes all depart-
ments, agencies, and. instrumentalities of the United States.10 8
Finally, the FFCA grants the EPA power to enforce administrative
compliance orders against federal facilities. 0 9 Thus, the FFCA dis-
pels any doubt as to whether Congress intended to make civil pen-
alties available in actions brought against federal facilities under
RCRA's citizen suit provision.
3. CWA Legislative History
The CWA's legislative history, like that of RCRA, demonstrates
that Congress intended to authorize citizen suits for civil penalties
against federal facilities. There is no support in either Senate or
House reports that "'person," as defined in section 309, did not
include "person" as defined in section 505 (including the United
States)." 0 Rather, faced with the misinterpretation by some fed-
eral circuit courts denying civil penalties under the CWA's citizen
suit provision prior to Ohio, Congress attempted to use clear statu-
tory language authorizing citizens to recover for pollution viola-
tions by federal facilities. The Senate Report stated that some
federal agencies had failed to abate pollution and request appropri-
105 Home, supra note 49, at 635.
106 Id. at 650-51.
107 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a).
108 Id. at § 6903(15).
109 Id. at § 6961(b)(1).
110 Axline, supra note 15, at 31.
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ations to develop control measures, thus authorizing citizens to sue
would expedite government performance under section 313 (the
federal facilities section)."' Thus, Congress sought to encourage
citizen participation in enforcement proceedings, especially against
federal facilities.
Moreover, in its reports on the CWA Amendments of 1977, the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee stated the pur-
pose of the amendments:
This act has been amended to indicate unequivocally that all
Federal facilities and activities are subject to all of the provi-
sions of State and local pollution laws. Though this was the
intent of the Congress in passing the 1972 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments, the Supreme Court,
encouraged by the Federal agencies, has misconstrued the
original intent." 2
Therefore, Congress granted the courts "specific jurisdiction... to
apply any appropriate civil penalties under § 1319(d)."" 3
An amendment similar to FFCA, the Federal Facilities Clean
Water Compliance Act (FFCWCA) was introduced on July 1, 1993
in the House of Representatives as an amendment to the CWA.1 4
"Federal violations of the CWA are no less serious than federal
RCRA violations, [and] this understanding was reflected in the
proposed legislation.""' 5 The bill would: (1),allow states to assess
civil penalties against federal agencies and (2) authorize the EPA
to issue unilateral administrative orders and assess penalties
against other federal agencies for CWA violations. 1 6 As of the
writing of this article, the FFCWCA has not been enacted.
D. Policy Arguments for Non-Restrictive Interpretations of
Sovereign Immunity Waivers
As a practical matter, citizen suit provisions explicitly recognize
that certain types of agency conduct require a system of state and
citizen oversight. Restrictive interpretations of corollary sovereign
111 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1971). This 1971 Senate Report was submit-
ted in support of S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which ultimately became the Clean
Water Act. The wording of section 505 remained unchanged with the 1977 Amendments
to the Act.
112 Sierra Club, 931 F.2d at 1428 (citing S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1972),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4392).
113 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
114 139 CONG. REC. E1720 (daily ed. July 1, 1993). -
115 Home, supra note 49, at 651-52.
116 Id. at 652.
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immunity waivers preclude effective citizen oversight. Thus, as a
theoretical matter, citizen suit provisions should inhibit interpreta-
tions of specific subsections of the statute as hostile to relief. In
other words, the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be
relied upon to limit the scope of a statute's plain language. Justice
Stevens' dissent in Nordic Village bemoaned the drawbacks of
applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity in an overly restrictive
manner:
The Court's stubborn insistence on 'clear statements' bur-
dens the Congress with unnecessary reenactment of provi-
sions that were already plain enough when read literally.
The cost to litigants, to the legislature, and to the public at
large, of this sort of judicial lawmaking is substantial and
unfortunate. Its impact on individual citizens engaged in lit-
igation against the sovereign is tragic.' 1
7
Although the legislative histories of RCRA and the CWA reveal
congressional intent to permit civil penalties against federal facili-
ties, the Court in Ohio denied this remedy. 1 8 Therefore, as Justice
Stevens predicted, Congress was required to amend these statutes
to meet the Court's overly restrictive test, thereby perpetuating a
wasteful pattern.
In this context, the primary purpose of a civil penalty is to defer
noncompliance identified through citizen oversight. The appellate
courts that upheld civil penalties under the citizen suit provisions
of RCRA and the CWA recognized the importance of monetary
damages in effectively deterring future violations by federal pol-
luters.119 Without the threat of civil penalties, the possibility of a
citizen suit provides little, if any, additional incentive for federal
polluters to comply with discharge limitations. Even the EPA's
civil penalty policy, which states "[t]he first goal of penalty assess-
ment is to deter people from violating the law," suggests that for
deterrence purposes alone, citizens should be able to sue federal
violators for civil penalties.12 0 It is undisputed that pollution is
equally harmful whether it comes from a private or federal source.
Therefore, considering the recognized deterrent effect of the threat
of civil penalty assessment, allowing citizens to obtain civil penal-
ties against federal polluters promotes environmental protection.
117 Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 45-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118 See supra parts III.C.2-3.
119 See supra part III.B.2.
120 Axline, supra note 15, at 30.
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Citizeft suits seeking recovery of civil penalties would provide
federal facilities with at least three powerful incentives to resolve
pollution problems quickly. First, penalized federal polluters must
explain to congressional oversight and budget committees why
they subjected the federal government to -penalties for environ-
mental violations. 121 In turn, Congress would more closely scruti-
nize requested appropriations, thereby increasing a federal
polluter's incentive to comply with pollution standards. 22 Second,
the penalized federal agency loses funds that it secured from Con-
gress. Such funds are paid to another federal account from which
the agency may not draw.123 Third, public stigma attaches to the
penalized agency.' 24 In contrast, the existing policy of no civil pen-
alties against federal facilities removes a substantial deterrent from
remedial mechanisms, and even if injunctive relief is awarded
against a violator, Congress and the public are rarely made aware
of the violations. 125
Civil penalties assessed against one federal polluter should also
deter other federal polluters. Currently, suits under the FFCA are
the only incentive for federal polluters to stop polluting. Even if
they are sued under other pollution control statutes, federal pol-
luters do not incur monetary sanctions. However, with civil penal-
ties, the potential liability often outweighs the benefits of
continuing to pollute and practices may change without the
expense of actual litigation. 126 Also, allowing citizens to bring suit
against federal polluters effectively increases citizens' bargaining
power by encouraging federal polluters to settle rather than engage
in protracted litigation, ultimately conserving judicial resources. 27
Despite obvious congressional and administrative intent to rely on
such civil penalties to achieve these desired effects, the Supreme
Court in Ohio ignored and undermined this intent by improperly
applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity and precluding civil
penalties under the citizen suit provisions of the CWA and
RCRA.128
121 Id. at 41.
122 Id. More specifically, agencies are forced to inform Congress of actual statutory vio-
lations and to then justify civil penalty expenditures. Id. at 43.
123 Home, supra note 49, at 654.
124 Id. at 655.
125 Axline, supra note 15, at 43.
126 Id. 'at 44.
127 Id. at 43.
128 See Ohio, 503 U.S. at 626-28.
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E. Post-Ohio Interpretations of Sovereign Immunity and Citizen
Enforcement
The Ohio decision not only restricted the scope of remedies avail-
able under the CWA and RCRA, it also prompted subsequent
judicial interpretation that weakened the federal facilities section
of CERCLA. 12 9 For example, in Maine v. Department of Navy, the
First Circuit held that CERCLA's federal facilities section does not.
waive sovereign immunity with respect to civil penalties.13 °
Fortunately, some courts have refused to extend the Ohio ration-
ale to CERCLA. In FMC Corp. v. United States,'3' an industrial
facility owner, sued the United States, seeking indemnification
under CERCLA for a portion of response costs based on the gov-
ernment's role in the operating the facility during World War II.
The Third Circuit held that CERCLA's waiver of sovereign immu-
nity could extend to regulatory activities (as opposed to noncom-
pliance) of the United States. 132 In so holding, the court refused to
"read undesignated conduct [into] the plain waiver of sovereign
immunity.' 1 33 Instead of following the unduly restrictive approach
to statutory interpretation endorsed by the majority in Ohio, the
court maintained that "CERCLA is a remedial statute which
should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals."' 34
Other courts have also disregarded the "unduly restrictive" and
"tortured" analysis in Ohio and applied this sensible approach
when interpreting RCRA and CWA provisions not at issue in
Ohio.35 For example, in United States v. New Mexico, 36 the Tenth
Circuit held that RCRA waives sovereign immunity from certain
state-imposed permit conditions that address the presence of
,radionuclides •in hazardous waste incinerated at Los. Alamos
129 CERCLA § 120 (a)(1) provides that "[e]ach department, agency and instrumentality
of the United States ... shall be subject to, and comply, with, this Chapter in the same
manner and to the same extent.., as any non governmental entity including liability under
section 107" of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1989). This language of CERCLA
§ 120 is "unclear" as "it could refer to (1) prospective coercive fines, (2) retrospective'civil
penalties, or (3) both." See also Home, supra note 49, at 652 n.132.
130 973 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (1st Cir. 1992).
131 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
132 Id. at 840. See also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 826 F.
Supp. 961, 965 (E.D. Va. 1993) (CERCLA's waiver of sovereign immunity permits the
recovery of attorneys' fees and litigation costs against the United States).
133 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 841.
134 Id. (quoting United States v. Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992)).
135 Ohio, 503 U.S. at 630-31 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136 32 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994).
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National Laboratory by the federal government. 137  These deci-
sions demonstrate that some courts do not necessarily feel bound
by Ohio when addressing other environmental contexts. The
results in these cases reflect the courts' willingness and ability to
distinguish Ohio,.even when applying the CWA and RCRA. Such
liberal interpretations of waiver ensure greater protection of health
and the environment by elevating the environmental requirements
and objectives of the statutes above a dogmatic application of the
sovereign immunity doctrine.138
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS AN APPROPRIATE LIMITATION
ON IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
In contrast to the above examples in which a strict application of
sovereign immunity serves only to undermine congressional intent
in federal environmental legislation, application of the doctrine in
another context sets important limits on citizen suits, thereby serv-
ing the objectives embodied in environmental protection legisla-
tion. The Gorge Act139 is one such environmental statute. Without
application of the sovereign immunity doctrine, the administering
agency would be incapable of -implementing this legislation. In dis-
missing suits against the sovereign premised on an implied private
right of action, courts have upheld the Act's environmental
objectives.
. Although a wealth of legislative history demonstrates congres-
sional intent to permit civil penalties under the citizen suit provi-
sions of the CWA and RCRA, the preclusion or inclusion of
private remedies is rarely addressed in the legislative history of
federal environmental statutes.1 40 For example, the Gorge Act was
passed in the waning hours of the 1986 congressional session
against entrenched political opposition, and lacks even the typical
committee notes as a guide to statutory interpretation.141 The leg-
137 Id.; see also New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. Department of Energy,
850 F. Supp. 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (The DOE waived its sovereign immunity under RCRA
and the CWA from the imposition of state environmental regulatory charges that reason-
ably approximated the benefits provided to DOE facilities by state services).
138 See New Mexico, 32 F.3d at 498 (citing Sierra Club v. Department of Energy, 770 F.
Supp. 578, 580 (D. Colo. 1991)).
139 Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 544-544p (1994).
140 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U.
Cm. L. REV. 394, 418 (1982) ("It has only been in unusual circumstances that Congress has
explicitly precluded private remedies in designating a regulatory regime. It has also been
rare that the issue has been addressed in the legislative history.").
141 Bowen Blair, Jr., The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area: The Act, Its Gene-
sis and Legislative History, 17 ENvmL. L. 863, 932 (1987).
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islative history explaining the Gorge Act consists only of statutory
language and several days of general discussion in the Senate and
the House. From this scant legislative history, courts must discern
congressional intent regarding the intricate details of the Act.
In this context, the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides a
reliable analytical framework that precludes additional private
rights of action through a narrow construction of waiver. By
requiring express waivers, courts can ensure that the goals of statu-
tory enforcement and environmental protection are carried out
consistently with the Act's plain meaning.
A. Background on Implied Private Rights of Action
The modem approach to implied private rights of action began
with the Supreme Court's four-part test in Cort v. Ash, 142 which
determines whether a private right of action should be created in a
statute that does not explicitly provide for one. In applying the
test, courts consider: (1) whether the plaintiff is a special benefici-
ary of the statute; (2) the legislative intent to deny or create a rem-
edy; (3) the consistency of private remedies with the purposes of
the statute; and (4) the extent to which the right and remedy are
traditionally left to state law.143 However, the introduction of citi-
zen suit provisions into comprehensive legislation has prompted a
strong presumption against implied private rights of action. Thus,
courts are unlikely to recognize private rights of action unless the
text or history of the statute reveal a congressional intent to allow
them.1'" Underlying this trend are notions that judicial creation of
private rights of action equals judicial lawmaking and that judi-
cially created remedies may conflict with the remedial scheme cre-
ated by Congress. 45
The court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n 146 articulated this rule in the environmental
law context. In Middlesex, the plaintiffs alleged that discharges and
ocean dumping of sewage had unlawfully damaged fishing grounds.
They claimed a private right of action under the CWA and the
142 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
143 Id at 78
144 Sunstein, supra note 140, at 413.
145 Sunstein, supra note 140, at 413-14. Note that the federal courts' general lawmaking
powers ended with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146 453 U.S. 1 (1981). See generally William H. Timbers & David A. Wirth, Private
Rights of Action and Judicial Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
403 (1985) (arguing that the denial of a private right of action under Middlesex should not
be expanded to deny judicial review of agency action).
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Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972.117 The
actions were not brought pursuant to the citizen suit provisions of
these acts because the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the statutory
notice requirements. 148 Because these statutes provided "elaborate
enforcement provisions," the Court concluded that Congress did
not intend to authorize additional judicial remedies for private citi-
zens, by implication. 49 Where congressional intent opposes addi-
tional implied remedies, "the courts are not authorized to ignore
this legislative judgment.' 150
B. Sovereign Immunity as Applied to the Gorge Act
Consistent with the rule in Middlesex, both the D.C. Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to the Gorge Act. In these cases, the doctrine
was used to construe narrowly the waiver of sovereign immunity
within the citizen suit provision, thereby precluding a "takings"
claim brought under the Gorge Act.' 51 As applied to legislation
for the protection of natural resources, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is an appropriate and valuable means of adhering to con-
gressional intent, precluding private causes of action not explicitly
provided for under a citizen suit provision.
1. The Gorge Act
The Columbia River Gorge is a "distinct geographic region with
a spectacular constellation of natural resources" that straddles the
states of Oregon and Washington.' 52 The Gorge Act aims to "pro-
tect and provide for the enhancement of the scenic, cultural, recre-
ational, and natural resources of the Columbia River Gorge.' 53
Simultaneously, it allows for economic growth in the area consis-
tent with the protective nature of the Act.15 1
147 453 U.S. at 4-5.
148 Id. at 6-7.
149 Id. at 14.
150 Id. at 18.
151 See infra notes 152-179 and accompanying text.
152 Lawrence Watters, The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 23 ENVTL.
L. 1127, 1128 (1993).
153 16 U.S.C. § 544a(1).
154 Id. at § 544a(2).
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Oregon and Washington adopted the Gorge Act through an
interstate compact.155 It provides for the creation of a regional
Commission responsible for the implementation and enforcement
of the Act.1 56 The Act ensures the application of uniform legal
standards to an area determined by Congress to have "critical
national significance.' 1 57 Pending formation of the Commission,
the statute directed the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate
interim guidelines for administration of the Gorge Act.158
To assist in securing compliance with the administrative provi-
sions of the Act, Congress included a provision authorizing citizen
suits against the Secretary in federal district court and suits against
the Commission in the Oregon and Washington state courts. 59
The provision grants citizens broad authority to enforce non-dis-
cretionary duties under the Gorge Act,'160 and it was fashioned
after citizen suit provisions found in other federal environmental
statutes.161 The Act requires written notification sixty days prior to
commencing a citizen suit' 62 and precludes suit if the state or the
United States Attorney General is diligently prosecuting a lawsuit
on the same matter. 163
155 Id. at § 544c (a)(1)(A). The resulting agreement between the states is the Columbia
River Gorge Compact, codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 196.150 (Butterworth 1991) and Wash.
Rev. Code. § 43.97.015 (West Supp. 1995).
156 16 U.S.C. § 544c(a)(1)(A). The Act specifies the voting composition of the Gorge
Commission as consisting of three members appointed by the Governor of each state, and
one member appointed by each of the six Gorge counties. Id. at § 544c(a)(1)(C)(i-iii).
Further, the Secretary of Agriculture appoints one Forest Service employee as a non-vot-
ing member of the Commission. Id. at § 544c(a)(1)(C)(iv).
157 See Columbia River Gorge United v. Yeutter, 960 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 184 (1992).
158 16 U.S.C. § 544h(a).
159 Id. at §§ 544m(b)(5), (6), (2).
160 16 U.S.C. § 544m(b)(2) provides:
Any person or entity adversely affected may commence an action to compel
compliance with . . - [this Act]:
(A) against the Secretary, the Commission, or any county where there is
alleged a violation of the provisions ... [of this Act], the management plan or
any land use ordinance or interim guideline adopted or other action taken by
the Secretary, the Commission, or any county pursuant to or... [under this
Act]; or
(B) against the Secretary, the Commission, or any county where there is
alleged a failure of the Secretary, the Commission, or any county to perform
any act or duty under... [this Act] which is not discretionary with the Secre-
tary, the Commission, or any county.
161 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)-(2).
162 16 U.S.C. § 544m(b)(3)(A)(i).
163 Id. at § 544m(b)(3)(A)(ii).
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2. Recent Treatment of the Scope of Waiver in the Gorge Act's
Citizen Suit Provision
Parties have brought suit under the Gorge Act's citizen suit pro-
vision alleging that actions of the Commission and the Secretary of
Agriculture constitute inverse condemnation. For example,
Broughton Lumber Co. v. Yeutter' 16 addressed whether the sover-
eign immunity waiver in section 544m(b)(2)(B) of the Gorge Act
extends, to a suit for an award of just compensation for an alleged
"taking" of property. 65
Prior to the enactment of the Gorge Act, plaintiff Broughton
acquired ownership rights to water flow and planned to produce
hydroelectric power from a river covered by the legislation.
Although Broughton had obtained a preliminary permit from the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in early 1987, later that
year the Forest Service informed Broughton that its proposed
hydroelectric project constituted a "new industrial development"
and was thus inconsistent with the provisions of the Gorge Act.
This decision prevented Broughton from fulfilling its plans to pro-
duce hydroelectric power with its water rights.166
Broughton subsequently filed suit, alleging that the decision
deprived it of all economic use of its water rights, amounting to a
taking of property without just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. In its complaint, Broughton
sought $2.5 million in damages, plus interest. 167 After a protracted
procedural history, 68 the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately
decided whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain
Broughton's claim for compensation either under the Gorge Act or
under its federal question jurisdiction.
164 939 F.2d 1547 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Broughton I).
165 Id. at 1550-51, 1551 n.2.
166 Id. at 1549.
167 Id.
168 After plaintiffs filed in the District Court, the government moved to transfer the case
to the Court of Claims on the basis that under the Tucker Act the Claims Court has exclu-
sive jurisdiction to adjudicate Broughton's inverse condemnation "takings" claim. The
motion was granted, and the District Court transferred the case to the Claims Court. At
that time, such orders were not appealable, and the Ninth Circuit denied a Writ of Manda-
mus. Broughton then voluntarily dismissed its complaint before it was answered, and sub-
sequently refiled the same claim in the same district court. The claim again was transferred
to the Claims Court, and because such transfer orders had been made appealable in the
interim, the second transfer was appealed to the D.C. Circuit. Id.
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After determining that the Claims Court did not have exclusive
jurisdiction over Broughton's suit, 69 the court considered whether
the waiver of sovereign. immunity in section 544m(b)(2) of the
Gorge Act extends to a suit alleging a taking of property. 70
Broughton claimed that its "civil action" was intended, to compel
compliance with both subsections of the citizen suit provision. 17 1
Broughton contended that its taking claim addressed a violation of
Gorge Act provisions, and it sought to compel performance of a
non-discretionary duty imposed on the Secretary under the Act.
The court noted that a minority of jurisdictions.interpret waivers of
sovereign immunity broadly, but nonetheless endorsed the "well-
established" rule that waivers of sovereign immunity should be
strictly construed. 72 The court then addressed Broughton's first
claim under the citizen suit provision.
Section 544m(b)(2)(A) authorizes civil actions against the Secre-
tary to compel compliance with the provisions of the Gorge Act.
Broughton asserted that the Secretary had violated section
544h(b)(1) of the Act, which gives the Secretary authority to con-
demn property until certain local ordinances take effect. 173 Thus,
Broughton alleged, "the Secretary failed to comply with the Gorge
Act by not paying just compensation to Broughton for the water
rights rendered valueless" by the Secretary's decision. 74
The court rejected this argument, noting that "[o]nly limited
funds were made available to the Secretary for such acquisi-
tions' 75 and recognizing that section 544h lacks a provision for
adjudicating an inverse condemnation claim.' 76 From these obser-
vations, the court concluded that [i]t clearly was not contemplated
by Congress that such claims would be paid by the Secretary from
the limited funds made available to him.' 1 77 The court stated that
169 The assumption that the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction of Tucker Act claims
for more than $10,000 is not based on any language in the Tucker Act. Because section 702
of the Administrative Procedure Act can be construed to authorize a district court to grant
monetary relief other than traditional "money damages," there was no reason to bar that
aspect of the relief available in the district court. Id. at 1550-51 (quoting Bowen v. Massa-
chusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)).
170 Id.. at 1551 n.2, 1552.
171 Id. at 1552.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1553. Section 544h(b)(1) provides that the Secretary may acquire by condem-
nation, any land or interest that is being used or threatened to be used in a manner inconr
sistent with the purposes for which the scenic area was established.
174 Id.
175 16 U.S.C. § 544n; Broughton I, 939 F.2d at 1553.
176 Broughton I, 939 F.2d at 1553.
177 Id.
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section 544m contemplates only injunctive or mandamus relief, not
damage awards.1 78 The court also noted that Broughton was not
actually attempting to "compel compliance" with section 544h
since it had failed to request that the Secretary file a condemnation
complaint. Instead, Broughton sought a judicial determination
that a taking had occurred and an award of damages for that
amount.17
9
The court summarily dismissed Broughton's additional argument
that section 544m(b)(2)(A) waives sovereign immunity for any
action taken by the Secretary under the Gorge Act, regardless of
whether a violation is alleged. 8 ° Although the court noted that,
"while the language of the Gorge Act is not clear, and, indeed,
appears defective in several respects," the application of sovereign
immunity mandated a conclusion that only a single waiver was
intended where a violation of the Act is alleged.18 1
Broughton's alternative statutory ground for jurisdiction under
the Gorge Act asserted that the Secretary had a non-discretionary
duty to pay compensation for any taking and, therefore, the citizen
suit provision authorized citizen compulsion of the Secretary. 182
Since this argument also rested on section 544h's grant of authority
to acquire land through condemnation, the court determined that
this claim suffered from the same infirmities as the first claim 183 -
the Secretary had no mandatory duty to acquire land through a
condemnation action.
Broughton's corollary argument under section 544m(b)(2)(B)
asserted that "the Secretary had a non-discretionary duty to pro-
mulgate regulations governing procedures and payment on inverse
condemnation claims.' 84 The court also rejected this theory, stat-
ing that a statutory scheme providing the Secretary with only lim-
ited power to acquire property cannot rationally encompass
inverse condemnation. 85 Moreover, the court faulted'Broughton
for failing to explain how an order to compel compliance required
an award of just compensation. 86 The court concluded that
"Broughton's claim for just compensation for an alleged 'taking' of
178 Id.
179 Id.
18o Id. at 1554 n.4.
181 Id.
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its water rights is therefore not a citizen suit to compel compliance
with a non-discretionary duty assigned to the Secretary by the
Gorge Act." '187
A strict interpretation of the two sections of the Gorge Act's
citizen suit. provision led the court to conclude that the District
Court of Oregon lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Broughton's
claim and that transfer to the Claims Court was therefore proper.
Had the court implied a private right of action in order to uphold
the constitutionality of the Gorge Act or under a theory of broad
waiver,188 it would have undermined the entire statutory scheme of
the Gorge Act.
In subsequent litigation, Broughton turned against the Gorge
Commission itself, and brought another takings claim on a differ-'
ent set of facts. 189 As this case dealt only with the jurisdictional
provisions of the Gorge Act, rather than the citizen suit provision,
it merits only a cursory discussion. However, the role of the sover-
eign immunity doctrine deserves recognition, as this decision also
demonstrates that the doctrine serves a valuable purpose when
applied to limit federal environmental causes of action to those
provided expressly by the statute.
Like the D.C. Circuit, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity in order to obtain a
restrictive interpretation of the Gorge Act's jurisdictional provi-
sions. The court concluded that a takings claim against the Com-
mission was improper in a federal forum and must be brought in
187 Id at 1555. The remaining issue that Broughton raised to obtain jurisdiction for the
taking claim involved neither interpretation of the Gorge Act, nor the application of sover-
eign immunity, and thus is beyond the scope of this article. However, regarding whet her a
constitutional question conferred federal jurisdiction upon the district court, the court held
that since the Tucker Act had conferred jurisdiction upon the Claims Courts prior to the
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), giving effect to Broughton's argument would implic-
itly repeal the Tucker Act. As repeals by implication are strongly disfavored and as spe-
cific jurisdictional provisions are to govern statutes conferring general jurisdiction, the
court rejected Broughton's § 1331 argument.
188 See generally Lomarch Corp. v. Englewood, 237 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1968) (reading into a
statute the requirement of compensation to uphold its constitutionality). "In construing a,
statute the presumption is that the legislature acted with existing constitutional law in mind
and intended the act to function in a constitutional manner .... Thus, it follows.., that the
legislature understood that any attempt to deprive a landowner of the use of his property
for one year would be unconstitutional absent an intent to compensate the landowner." Id.
at 884 (citation omitted)..
189 Brought6n Lumber Co. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 975 F.2d 616 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993) (Broughton II).
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state court according to section 544m(b)(6) of the Act.190 This
restrictive reading upholds the protective purposes of the Act.' 9'
In this case, Broughton contended that the Gorge Act and the
interstate compact waived sovereign immunity for actions brought
against the Gorge Commission in federal court. Dismissing the
argument that Congress' approval of the compact provided the
necessary federal waiver of sovereign immunity, the court stated
that this "terse enactment provision [did not] constitute an 'unmis-
takably clear' statement of Congress' intent to abrogate [the Com-
mission's] immunity to suit in federal court." 192 In addition, the
court strictly construed the jurisdictional provisions of the Gorge
Act (despite a provision in the Compact empowering the Commis-
sion to "sue and be sued") and found that the Commission had not
explicitly waived its sovereign immunity to suits brought in federal
court. "Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 544m(b)(6), actions involving the
Commission's waiver shall be brought in the state courts of Oregon
and Washington. The Commission's waiver of sovereign immunity
in the State courts does not act as a waiver of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity in the federal coutts."'1 93  Therefore, the court
again interpreted the Gorge Act strictly, precluding implied private
rights of action aimed at undermining, rather than enforcing, the
environmental protection objectives of the Gorge Act.194
190 16 U.S.C: § 544m(b)(6) provides:
The State courts of the States of Oregon and Washington shall have jurisdic-
tion -
(A) to review any appeals taken to the Commission pursuant to subsection
9(a)(2) of this section;
(B) over any civil action brought by the Commission pursuant to subsection
(b)(1) of this section or against the Commission, a State, or a county pursuant
to'subsection (b)(2) of this section.
191 All other takings claims against the Gorge Commission have been brought in state
court. See, e.g., Murray v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1319 (Or. App. 1993);
Tucker v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 867 P.2d 686 (Wash. App. 1994).
192 Broughton II, 975 F.2d at 619.
193 Id. at 619-20.
194 The takings issue reached the state courts in an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief brought against Washington and the Gorge Commission. The action was dismissed
as "beyond the scope of the limited waiver of sovereign immunity" contained in the citizen
suit provision. The Washington Court of Appeals' reasoning echoed that of the Broughton
I court. Klickitat County v. State, 862 P.2d 629 (Wash. App. 1993).
Similarly, in Friends of the Columbia Gorge v. Espy, a magistrate for the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed an action brought under the citizen suit
provision of the Gorge Act against the Oregon and Washington Forest Practice Boards, the
Washington Department of Natural Resources, and the Gorge Commission. No. 94-1228-
AS (D. Or. Apr. 14, 1995). Citing the Gorge Act's legislative history, the magistrate fol-
lowed Broughton IH and held that "neither the states nor the Commissioh waived their
Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to actions in federal court under the Act." Id.
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C. Policy Arguments for Restricting Implied Rights of Action
Under Federal Environmental Laws
"[J]udicially created private rights of action may frustrate statu-
tory purposes [of enforcement] by allowing private litigants to
bypass the administrative process entirely and permitting the
nature and extent of enforcement to be dictated by the judici-
ary. '195 Such circumvention may disrupt the agency's authority to
make law and policy, a critical element of regulation. 196 Several
policy rationales support limiting private rights of action arising
under federal environmental laws to those explicitly authorized
within the citizen suit provision. These rationales include:
statutory Integrity. The substantive and remedial provisions of
a statute may represent a legislative compromise that would be
undermined if courts were to create private remedies on their
own.
197
* Agency Specialization. Private rights of action will often
require courts to make determinations for which they lack the spe-
cialized fact-finding and policy-making competence of the relevant
agency.198
* Agency Centralization and Autonomy. Decentralized courts
may not be able to produce a consistent and coordinated enforce-
ment process. Resolution of issues on an ad hoc basis produces
varied results and unpredictability for the regulator and the regu-
lated. The result could weaken a carefully balanced regulatory
scheme by invalidating practices that the federal agency decided to
permit, or by imposing sanctions that are different from those pre-
ferred by the agency. 199
* Collective Interests. Collective benefits are typically better
protected through public enforcement mechanisms than through
private remedies.20 ° When a benefit is jointly shared, Congress
may disfavor private remedies because enforcement at the request
of one beneficiary necessarily affects others, possibly in undesir-
at 6. Therefore, the court granted the states' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and dismissed, sua sponte, the action against the Commission on the same
ground. Id. at 6-7.
195 Sunstein, supra note 140, at 414.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 414, 416.
198 lId at 416.
199 Id. at 417.
200 Id. at 435.
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able ways. Thus, a public enforcement mechanism is preferable
and might be undermined by additional private enforcement.2 °'
If these principles are true in the context of private enforcement
actions beyond the scope of citizen suit provisions, then actions
aimed at collecting damages from an agency would certainly under-
mine the effectiveness and integrity of environmental protection
regulations. For example, in the Columbia River Gorge, damages
awarded against the Commission would result in fewer regulations
and would weaken the enforcement of existing ones. If a private
cause of action is substantially similar to a cause of action provided
for in the citizen suit provision, the citizen suit provision should
presumptively supplant the private cause of action; otherwise, the
statutory remedy would be redundant. If, on the other hand, the
two are materially different from one another, the statutory rem-
edy should still preclude the private remedy since the private cause
of action would effectively nullify the conditions imposed on the
intended remedy.20 2
V. THE PROPOSED SYNTHESIS
Courts applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the con-
text of citizen enforcement of federal environmental laws are faced
with a dilemma - whether, and under what circumstances, the
doctrine should be applied to restrict private rights of action. One
resolution limits the private rights of action available under envi-
ronmental legislation to those intended for enforcement purposes
and explicitly provided for within citizen suit provisions. Once this
threshold is met, all remedies under the statute, including civil pen-
alties, should be available to citizens who have standing to bring
actions under these provisions. Congressional objectives are best
upheld by subjecting the injuring party to the greatest possible
deterrent against future violations, thereby also deterring other
Violators.
This proposal is consistent with the evolution of the general the-
ory of citizen enforcement under federal environmental laws. Pro-
vided that citizen enforcement efforts supplement (rather than
supplant) government enforcement objectives, federal courts have
generally welcomed citizen suits under environmental laws. Once
the troublesome threshold of standing is. crossed, the enforcement
authority inherent in citizen suits is expansive and has expanded
201 Id. at 436.
202 Id. at 427.
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dramatically in the past decade, particularly with respect to citizen
suits for civil penalties. °3
Citizen suits under federal environmental statutes are subject to
abuse; however, abuse is the exception rather than the rule. More-
over, various safeguards such as rigid standing requirements and
the requirement that such actions be consistent with the overall
enforcement goals of the statute exist to keep such abuse to a mini-
mum. Nevertheless, concern that plaintiffs should not derive per-
sonal gain through their enforcement actions is common to citizen
enforcement of federal environmental laws. Courts have
addressed this "altruism" concern and have reached conclusions
that are consistent with the holdings in Broughton I and Broughton
II. These courts have considered and properly rejected citizen
actions in other environmental contexts that were held to be incon-
sistent with the goals of the statutes' enforcement schemes. 20 4
In the context of sovereign immunity, the Ohio Court's restric-
tive reading of the citizen enforcement schemes under RCRA and
the CWA is symptomatic of the Court's restrictive approach to citi-
zen enforcement of environmental laws in general.20 5  In other
words, the Ohio decision is more a case concerning citizen enforce-
ment of environmental laws than it is a case about sovereign immu-
nity. The case reflects the unfortunate paranoia embraced by many
courts in the area of citizen enforcement of federal environmental
laws. Such courts assume that citizen suits pose a threat, rather
203 See, e.g., Williams v. Leybold Tech, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.Cal. 1992) (awarding
citizen plaintiffs 6ivil penalties in suit against manufacturer for its wholly past violation of
section 311 of Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act for failing to file a
Material Safety Data Sheet); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d
1350 (9th Cir. 1990) (approving CWA consent decree between environmental group and
manufacturing plant, under which the plant admitted no violations, but agreed to pay vari-
ous environmental groups funds to be applied in ways that would further the goals of the
Act). See also Elizabeth R. Thagand, Note, The Rule That Clean Water Act Civil Penalties
Must Go to the Treasury and How to Avoid It, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 507 (1992).
204 See, e.g., Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800
(11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Southern Timber Purchasers Council v; Meier, 114
S. Ct. 683 (1994) (dismissing, for lack of standing, action under the Endangered Species
Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and National Forest Management Act brought by
timber companies and their trade association; plaintiffs' alleged economic and environmen-
tal injuries were not actionable under the preservation goals of the statutes).
205 Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions restricting the
scope of citizen enforcement of federal environmental laws. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smith-
field, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (disallowing CWA citizen
suits for wholly past violations); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989)
(requiring strict compliance with the literal language of the 60-day notice requirement in
RCRA's citizen suit provision as a prerequisite to filing suit); Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (limiting environmental standing).
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than a boost, to the enforcement goals of a given environmental
statute: Regardless of the purported legal or policy basis underly-
ing Ohio and the decisions following it, the underlying rationale for
reaching such a myopic result stems from these courts' fundamen-
tal distrust of citizen enforcement actions. These courts apparently
refuse to acknowledge that appropriate limits, such as those articu-
lated in this proposal, can and have been drawn to minimize the
potential drawbacks and enhance the potential gains inherent in
citizen enforcement actions under federal environmental laws.,
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has drawn considerable crit-
icism. Such criticism is justified in situations where the doctrine is
applied to limit remedies authorized under the express language of
a citizen suit provision. This practice undermines congressional
intent and, ultimately, the effectiveness of environmental legisla-
tion. The early split in the circuits between broad and restrictive
interpretations of immunity waivers, resolved in 1992 by the
Supreme Court in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,
illustrates this point. Despite express statutory language, clear con-
gressional intent, statutory rules of interpretation, and several pol-
icy considerations, the Court in Ohio held that neither RCRA nor
the CWA allows citizens to sue federal, facilities for civil penalties.
In this context, use of the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be
reformed. Post-Ohio cases under RCRA, the CWA, and CER-
CLA suggest the inception of a potential and welcome departure
from the rationale articulated in Ohio.
However, the sovereign immunity doctrine in the context of citi-
zen enforcement of federal environmental laws should not be com-
pletely abolished. The doctrine continues to serve a valuable
purpose in limiting private actions brought under federal environ-
mental statutes to those that Congress explicitly intended. Cases
interpreting the Gorge Act illustrate this point by precluding tak-
ings claims against the administering agency under the Act. The
courts had the opportunity to construe liberally or narrowly the
congressional waiver of sovereign immunity embodied in the Act's
citizen suit provision, yet the rules of the doctrine demanded a nar-
row construction from the courts.
Abiding by the express terms of citizen suit provisions allows an
agency to implement congressional directives without "undue
interference" from actions by citizens seeking to secure personal
gain through "private" enforcement of environmental legislation.
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Thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be abolished,
but simply reformed so as to not unduly restrict the remedial focus
of citizen suit provisions in federal environmental laws.

